"…. we recognize the challenges that may be faced by non-reciprocal preference beneficiary Members as a consequence of the MFN liberalization that will result from these negotiations. We instruct the Negotiating Group to intensify work on the assessment of the scope of the problem with a view to finding possible solutions." 3 And in more recent statements, the NAMA chairman states that "progress has been slow" 4 or "there is no consensus on possible solutions" 5 .
As supposed to be particularly focused on the needs of the developing countries, indeed it has been dubbed the Doha Development Agenda, and this makes preference erosion particularly problematic since it exposes differences in the interests of developing countries. These concerns also allow those developed countries seeking to resist an agreement to present their opposition in a more favorable light by justifying it on the grounds that they do not wish to harm such countries. 6 How big a problem is preference erosion? The answer has both economic and political dimensions. The economic studies generally conclude that in the aggregate the costs are likely to be modest, but that for some countries costs could be significant. 7 In estimates using a partial equilibrium framework, Limão and Olarreaga (2005) find the largest absolute potential losses for LDCs from a Doha Agreement that reduced MFN tariffs by 33% would be sustained by Bangladesh ($202 million), Malawi ($151 million) and Madagascar ($63 million). As a share of GDP the largest losses are Malawi (8.6%), Lesotho (2.7%) and Sao Tome and Prince (1.6%). For 26 of the 48 countries though, losses are less than 0.1% of GDP. To be sure, there will be losses to all countries that 6 Limao and Ollareaga (2005) page 2 note for example that in 2000 the European Commission resisted a reduction in Sugar price supports on the grounds that it would hurt developing countries exporting sugar to the EU under preferential arrangements. 7 Similarly, Hoekman and Prowse (2005) for example, find significant impacts of preference erosion on small island economies and least developed countries dependent on sugar, bananas, and garments-Cape Verde, Haiti, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe. The effects are adverse as well for six middle income countries, Belize, Fiji, Mauritius, Guyana. St Kitts and Nevis, and St Lucia. The average preference margin for LDCs in the Quad was estimated by the IMF to be 10.9%. But this number hides large disparities: only 10 out of the 47 countries enjoy an average preference margin greater than 10%. As for middle-income countries, the IMF (2004, p.24) estimated the average preference margin to be 4.9%, or 15.6% for the largest beneficiaries. Out of 76 middle-income developing countries, only 18 had preference margins above 5%. Grynberg and Silva (2004) obtain larger estimates of $1.72 billion but the bulk of these reflect losses due to the end of the Agreement on Textiles in 2005 and not the current Round.
. 5 currently benefit from preferences, but for many these are small and would be offset by the benefits of additional liberalization in a successful Round. But this might not be true for all.
This means that the losses are politically problematic in the context of the WTO negotiations. The WTO operates by consensus. To be adopted, therefore, each agreement should be a Pareto improvement i.e. it should provide benefits, while at the same time, making no member worse off. If a group of countries is hurt by an agreement, obtaining their assent might not be easy.
Preferences such as GSP are extended unilaterally. They are allowed but not required by WTO rules. It might be possible, therefore, to pressure recalcitrant countries to go along by threatening them with additional losses of preferences or cuts in other forms of aid. But this would not be wise. There is a widespread view, particularly among the least developed countries that they were hurt by the previous Uruguay Round. The perception that the Doha Round has also failed in this respect could deal a major blow to the trading system's legitimacy.
Options
What should be done to respond to these concerns? One approach that has been considered is to avoid liberalization in sectors with significant preferences. This would take care of the concerns about losses, but it would also seriously undermine the goal of the Round to apply the deepest cuts to the highest tariffs and those of particular interest to developing country exporters. 8 It turns out that preference erosion is particularly important in sugar, bananas, and textiles and apparel and neglecting liberalization in such 6 sectors could be a very serious omission. 9 A variant of this approach, which has been seriously contemplated in the Agriculture Committee, is to delay implementation of liberalization in these sectors. 10 But by themselves such delays simply postpone the problem, rather than taking care of it.
Ideally, all parties should receive offsetting benefits from the Round, but if they cannot, the classic way to obtain consensus when some may lose from an agreement is through side payments. A second response, therefore, is to provide financial compensation. If the winners compensate the losers, universal support can be achieved.
But how should such compensation be provided? Hoekman and Prowse (2005) emphasize that the preferences have been granted bilaterally and argue that "compensation for losses should take place outside the WTO so as to make the trading system less distorted". Limão and Olarreaga (2005) also propose a bilateral solution in which developed countries granting preferences convert the preferences into import subsidies with equivalent values. With these in place, preference erosion would indeed no longer be a concern.
A fully decentralized approach might not, however, create binding WTO obligations and is likely to be seen as ignoring a problem that -for better or worse -has 9 See for example Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) 10 A chairman's summary of the discussions on liberalization modalities for agriculture in March 2003, for example suggested that "In implementing their tariff reduction commitments, participants undertake to maintain, to the maximum extent technically feasible, the nominal margins of tariff preferences and other terms and conditions of preferential arrangements they accord to their developing trading partners…tariff reductions affecting long-standing preferences in respect of products which are of vital export importance for developing country beneficiaries. Nonetheless, such concerns are beside the point unless the most important question is answered, which is where will the money for compensation come from? There are reasons why countries have provided assistance through the opaque channel of trade preferences rather than explicit and more transparent import subsidies. Despite their conceptual equivalence, it is easier politically to forego money that would otherwise be raised through tariffs by providing preferences than it is to actually raise money through taxes and then dispense it as foreign assistance. Since developed countries will be richer if the round is successful, they should be willing to compensate the losers to facilitate agreement, but it has proven much easier to provide compensation through trade concessions than to obtain monetary payments. In general, the currency of the WTO is trade concessions and there is strong resistance to introducing monetary payments into the system.
In sum, there seem to be two approaches to dealing with preference erosion. 14 It is no surprise that according to the report of the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Market access in late April 2006, "Positions continue to be extremely polarized on the issue of non-reciprocal preferences. While more work has been done in respect of assessing the scope of the problem, and there is a recognition that both the number of Members and number of products affected are limited, in the view of some Members' further assessment of the scope of the problem has to be undertaken on a line-by-line, and country-by-country basis. Others feel that the scope of the problem has been assessed and there now needs to be trade solutions to address the identified problems. Such a trade solution could take the shape of a correction coefficient or longer implementation periods for affected products. However, another view has
The trade approaches are contentious because they pit developing countries that are dependent on preferences against those that are not. Several features of this proposal merit attention. First, the proposal avoids making exceptions for liberalization commitments in sectors in which preference erosion is significant. All sectors would be subject to same Swiss formula in NAMA, for example, and in the final year of the implementation period, the liberalization would be complete and comprehensive. The only difference for vulnerable commodities is that the phase-in of the liberalization is back-loaded instead of being adopted incrementally as with other commitments.
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A second feature is that the money raised to finance compensation does not come at the expense of developed country government revenues. The mechanism per se requires no additional taxes. Treasuries in the developed countries will experience a reduction in tariff revenues from any new agreement, but the mechanism will make no difference to the amount of the reduction.
Third, the proposal builds in compensation for the losers by the winners. The winners from trade liberalization -typically consumers in the developed countries and (mostly developing country) exporters subject to MFN tariffs in the rest of world --pay implicitly through some delay in their benefits. But both these parties are no worse off than they are today with the current MFN rates. Moreover, there is evidence that the existence of preferences in particular sectors has led to less liberalization. 16 Thus to the degree that our compensation mechanism mitigates resistance by preference recipients, it will lead to greater liberalization than would other wise be possible. This means that these "winners" would actually be better off with the plan than without it. Competitive developing countries would of course prefer a solution in which the developed countries provide generous financial compensation and their trade benefits are immediate. But this might not be feasible and without any compensation, an agreement might be impossible.
The plan should also help increase support for a Doha agreement in developed countries once it is negotiated. In the developed countries, producers that compete with imports will benefit temporarily by being given more time to adjust in what the presence of tariffs peaks and valuable preferences suggests are quite sensitive sectors. Distributors of developing country products that capture some of the preference rents would likewise 16 See Limao and Olarreaga (2005) 12 have some of their losses mitigated. Both groups will therefore have an incentive to lobby for the plan's implementation so that the waiver can be granted.
Most importantly, however, the adversely affected developing countries would benefit in two ways. The delayed implementation would give them more time to adjust and second, they would be compensated for their losses thereafter.
We would favor providing countries experiencing preference erosion with full discretion over their use of the funds. These countries could independently determine to what purpose the compensation should be used. Ideally the funds would be sufficient to allow countries to provide exporters with a subsidy equal to the erosion of the preference benefit in perpetuity but countries might prefer to use the resources to promote diversification or for other developmental purposes. The least developed countries are not subject to the prohibition on export subsidies in the Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures Agreement (SCM), but if necessary, we would favor an exemption for other developing countries to use the funds as export subsidies, for a limited period. Finally, this would be a separate program from the more general Aid for Trade initiative to highlight the fact that the funds provided are clearly additional and for a different purpose. It would also have the benefit of not being embroiled in the issue of how to distinguish between assistance for trade capacity and support for a general economic development agenda on the other. 
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Show me the money.
However appealing this proposal might be in principle, a crucial question is whether it is practical. In particular, could sufficient funds be raised in relatively limited periods of time, so that delays in implementation could be short and the revenues adequate to compensate for performance erosion? The answer to this question is obviously dependent on (a) the value of the benefit erosion; (b) the particular beneficiaries/programs that are covered; (c) value of revenues raised currently through MFN and MFN-related tariffs and (d) the MFN liberalization that is contemplated.
We will report on exercises undertaken with a focus on the benefits enjoyed by the ACP countries (which include 41 out of the 50 least developed countries) through their preferences in the US and the European Union. In both cases, we will demonstrate that the funds that could be raised through fairly short delays in implementation are more than adequate to provide generous compensation for preference erosion. In particular, we estimate that a delay of four years by the EU in the implementation of a reduction in We should emphasize that what follows are simply illustrative examples and in making the estimates we have had to make numerous simplifying assumptions. However, we have tried to be conservative, erring on the side of underestimating the proposal's viability. We should also make clear that these examples are not meant to prejudge the precise scheme that should be adopted. That is a matter for negotiation.
Preference valuation. There is no consensus in the literature on the value of preferences and the costs associated with erosion in the face of reductions in MFN rates. The most widely used definition of preference margin is simply the difference between the MFN tariff applied to a certain product and the preferential tariff enjoyed by a particular country. But there are several reasons this will overstate the value of the preference to the recipient country. The first is that there are additional production costs associated with meeting rules of origin to obtain preferences and additional administrative costs in proving eligibility. 18 The second is that if conditions are not competitive, third parties may capture some of the rents implicit in the preferences. 19 A third issue relates to the role played by competitors whose exports are not subject to MFN tariffs. Conceptually, the value of the preference should equal the difference between the domestic and world price. If other countries have access to the domestic market of the preference granting member at less than MFN rates, the difference between domestic and world price could be less than the preference margin. Indeed, if a tariff line is served only by preferential imports, say, garments from Mexico and CBI, the US price for those 18 François, Hoekman and Manchin (2005) Sugar and banana explain ¾ of preference margins for countries where preference margins >5%. With a 0 elasticity of export supply (e), greatest losers in % of exports are Mauritius (11.5%)), St.Lucia (9.8%), Belize(9.1%), St.Kitts and Nevis(8.9), Guyana(7.9%) With a 1.5 e, fall in export revenues to Mauritius reaches 23.7%. In terms of GDP losses, the greatest losers are Guyana (5.8%), Mauritius (4.4%) and Fiji(2.2%). On average, for all 76 countries, losses are between 0.5% and 1.2& of total exports, depending on e. The value of preferences in agriculture -banana, sugar and beef -is US$ 536 m. And US$ 1.32 b. in textiles. Considering an adjustment period of 14 years and using a 3% annual discount rate, the NPV of losses to be financed is between US$ 6 and 13.8 billion.
UNCTAD ( were exported to the EU duty free. As Reported in Table 1 the MFN tariff rates on these products ranged from 24.25 percent on Tuna to 5.5 percent on methanol. Overall, weighted by the value of 2004 exports to the EU this works out to an average preference of 11.1 percent with the revenue that would have been raised by the EU had this value of exports been subject to MFN tariffs equal to 11.1 percent or 414 million dollars. This attribution is of course an overstatement since it assumes all exports from eligible countries actually qualify for duty-free treatment, i.e. meet the requisite rules of origin.
In our simulation we will assume that in the Doha Round it is agreed that NAMA tariff reduction for developed countries will be undertaken using a Swiss formula with 21 To be considered as vulnerable: (i) the vulnerability index should at least be equal to 1; (ii) the margin of preference enjoyed by the country on its exports to the partner country, in this case the EU and the US, is at least equal to 5 %; (iii) the product exported to the partner country should represent at least 5% in the total country export, aggregated at the level of HS4; (iv) the country market share in the partner country should represent at least 2% of a given product for it to be taken into account; and (v) the export share of the country in the world market should be less than 2 %." See Communication of the tariff foregone assuming that all products from these countries are actually able to meet the rules of origin for the preferences, and assuming that otherwise these products would have to pay the MFN rate.
revenues. Had the EU subjected all its non-LDC imports in these product
categories to its MFN tariffs in 2004, it would have raised 3.5 billion dollars. However, the EU also granted other importers preferences so this overstates the potential revenue.
Some imports entered under GSP 24 and some under other preferential trading agreements. In many cases, the EU ties its GSP preferences to MFN rates and some products from countries with Free Trade Agreements will enter the EU at MFN rates where they cannot meet qualifying rules of origin. Unfortunately, our data base does not provide us with a precise matching of revenues and particular imports. We assume therefore (a) all imports from beneficiaries of non-reciprocal preferences enter at the 20 preferential rate; (b) all imports from countries that do not have preferential trading arrangements with the EU enter at MFN rates; (c) all imports from developing countries come in at GSP rates and (d) a third of other imports (i.e. from preferential trading partners other than beneficiaries of non-reciprocal preferences) enter at MFN rates. 25 As reported in Table 2 , making these assumptions we estimate that in 2004, EU tariff revenues on these products amounted to $1.821 billion dollars of which $289.9 million came from countries paying the full MFN tariffs, $914 million entered under GSP rates and another $628.5 million from countries with PTAs.
Using 2004 import levels as the base year value and the assumption that the EU reduces its tariffs using a Swiss-formula with a parameter of 10 percent, these MFN- 27 . These numbers demonstrate that these products are important, not only because the LDCs are vulnerable to preference erosion, but also because these products constitute a disproportionately large share of the remaining barriers to the US market. This fact turns out to make our plan a substantial revenue raiser. China is by far the largest contributor to collected duties, followed by Hong Kong, Indonesia, India and Vietnam.
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In Tables 4a and 4b, Moreover, we have reason to believe that these revenues are underestimated.
First, the estimates used here are obtained by multiplying the dutiable values by the six digit MFN tariffs. But the US reports actual duties collected by HTs categories. These indicate that the annual average duty actually collected on imports of these products between 2002 and 2005 was $6.56 billion -about fifty percent larger than our estimates using the MFN rates at the 6 digit level. As shown in Table 5 , taking a weighted average of the underestimates suggests that in the case of the 33 percent reduction, for example, the MFN revenues would be as $4.8 billion dollars rather than $3.6 billion we have obtained. With the interest rate at four percent, a five billion dollar fund could support annual payments of 500 million for 14 years for a total of almost twenty years of compensation. In addition, our sample included products accounting for only 28 products accounting for 72 percent of overall tariff revenues, thus revenues could be almost forty percent larger if the relationships of the omitted categories were proportional.
We have not tried to estimate the revenue foregone by unilateral preferences and the costs of preference erosion in the case of the US -this is not a simple task given the complexity of the US tariff schedule. However, Limão and Olarreaga (2005) use a partial equilibrium model to calculate the value of preference erosion for LDCs from a reduction in tariffs by a third at Doha. They estimate that the loss to LDCs from such reductions by the US would amount to $166 million. (They estimate similarly that losses from a one third reduction would be $441 million for the EU and $17 million for Japan). To fully compensate for such the present discounted value with a four percent discount rate the US would require 166 * 25 = 4.15 billion dollars an amount easily raised through our proposal. Interestingly, the plan proposed by Page required $500 million per year for ten years, and could be financed by our approach. In sum, in the case of the US the LDCs could be fully compensated for the present discounted value of their preference erosion using this proposal.
Conclusions
We have shown how the current deadlock over unilateral preferences in the Doha Round could be broken by a program that would combine delays in introducing MFN reductions with an allocation of the funds generated by these delays to countries hurt by preference erosion. The fact that MFN tariffs are relatively high in sectors of importance to developing countries has generated friction and deadlock among developing countries.
On the one hand, highly competitive developing countries have the much to gain if these tariffs are reduced; on the other hand, some of the poorest and least developed countries have much to lose if their preferences are eroded. For our proposal to work though, the relatively high tariffs in vulnerable sectors are a virtue because it means that modest delay in implementation can generate sufficient funds to compensate those who lose from preference erosion.
The scope for additional compensation through further trade liberalization is limited to the degree that the least developed countries have already been given --or are scheduled to receive --full duty-free market access for everything but arms (EBA) as in the case of the EU. The scope in the case of the US, however, remains considerable and should be explored. 29 Moreover, there are other ways of compensating the losers more directly through the trade concessions that should also be explored. Exporters of 29 The US has agreed at the Hong Kong Ministerial to increase to 97 percent the share of tariff lines available to LDC products duty free and quota free by 2008 or when a final Doha agreement is implemented. However, the initiative is a political commitment and not a binding obligation and of course a few tariff lines can account for a large share of trade. Inside US Trade, December 19, 2005 page 4.
textiles and apparel could be given more liberal rules of origin; 30 exporters of labor services could be given special S&D benefits under mode four in the GATS negoitations;
and non-LDC exporters of agricultural products such as sugar and bananas could be given more generous tariff rate quotas. But once these channels are exhausted, we have shown here, there exists another mechanism should seriously be considered.
The empirical work in this paper has been limited, in part by data availability and we are well aware that more work needs to be done. We offer three areas in which this should occur. First, there should be explorations of the plan using better data and different groups of beneficiaries. Second, there should be more thought about how the funds should be used. And finally, consideration could be given as to the merits and dangers of the mechanism we have proposed here as a more general approach to generating aid for trade. Tables 
